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Expressing Doubts About Expressivism
Heidi M Hurdt
There are five theories that are common coins in exchanges
about how punishment can best be justified. And there are some
profound problems that confront each of these theories that have
motivated criminal law theorists to seek new justifications for
the state's ability to deprive citizens of their liberty, and some-
times their lives. The contender in vogue today is expressivism,
which finds punishment a promising means of contradicting the
"social meanings" of crimes and declares the communicative
function to be the highest and best goal of the justice system. My
questions in this Article are these: Can expressivism carve out a
space for itself that is genuinely separate from the other theories
that have long competed for dominance in criminal law theory?
And if it can lay claim to philosophical autonomy, does expressiv-
ism provide a conceptually coherent and morally attractive al-
ternative to its classic competitors?
As a means of getting some purchase on these questions, I
shall first outline the five traditional goals that have been set for
the criminal law and provide a thumbnail sketch of the problems
that pose the greatest obstacles to theorists who seek to defend
them. This will enable us both to measure the theoretical space
that is left for a sixth alternative and to assess the promise of
expressivism as a contender.
I shall suggest in Part II that the reliance placed by expres-
sivism on the notion of crimes and punishments having "social
meanings" renders it conceptually troubled, if not incoherent,
and the moral difficulties that an expressivist theory of punish-
ment invites are reminiscent of those raised in response to sev-
eral of the more traditional theories upon which it is supposed to
be an improvement. When one takes seriously the significance of
the conceptual and moral problems encountered by attempts to
defend an expressive justification of punishment, one cannot
claim that it poses a formidable challenge to the traditional theo-
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ries that have long vied for dominance in criminal law jurispru-
dence.
I. FIvE TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
A. Corrective Justice Theory
Let us begin with the aims of the corrective justice theorist
(sometimes described as the restorative justice theorist'), whose
concern is with employing criminal punishment to compensate or
restore victims who have been wronged by offenders. According
to the corrective justice theorist, punishment of an offender is
justified if and only if it vindicates the offender's victim.2 Correc-
tive justice is the animating theme behind the new victims'
rights movement that has asserted itself throughout Western
nations in recent years, and it is the source of many proposed
procedural changes in the criminal justice system, such as the
admission of victim impact statements and victim testimony at
sentencing.3
The most pressing question for a corrective justice theory is
this: Does it have any internal checks on the amount of punish-
ment imposed on an offender, or will it be vulnerable to charges
that it will license gross over- and under-punishment? In two
words, the problem is summed up as follows: Lorena Bobbit!
Suppose that what it takes to vindicate a victim of domestic
abuse is castration, torture, or death. Is there anything internal
to a corrective justice theory that checks the conclusion that if
this is what it takes, then this is what ought to be administered?
The corrective justice theorist might answer by insisting
that whether a victim is vindicated or not depends not upon
whether she is subjectively restored to psychic repose, but upon
1 See, for example, Heather Strang and John Braithwaite, eds, Restorative Justice:
Philosophy to Practice (Ashgate 2000).
2 See, for example, Kathleen Daly, Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive
and Restorative Justice, in Strang and Braithwaite, Restorative Justice at 36 (cited in
note 1) (stating that, in the context of contrasting restorative justice to "traditional justice
practices," the emphasis in restorative justice "is on repairing the harm between the
offender and the victim").
3 See Barbara Hudson, Victims and Offenders, in Andrew von Hirsch, et al, eds,
Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? 177,
179-80 (Hart 2003) ("All versions of restorative justice have at their centre the opportu-
nity provided for the victim to recount what the offence meant to her."); Allison Morris
and Warren Young, Reforming Criminal Justice: The Potential of Restorative Justice, in
Strang and Braithwaite, eds, Restorative Justice at 15 (cited in note 1) (stating that a
strong presence for the victim in criminal justice processes is central to restorative jus-
tice).
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whether her offender is forced to disgorge the objective benefits
that he unjustly reaped at her expense. On this argument, while
a victim's blood-thirst might know no bounds, and so provides no
limits to an offender's punishment, an offender's unjust enrich-
ment both is susceptible to objective measure and happily coin-
cides with what he justly deserves to lose. Hence, if punishment
deprives a wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gains, then it vindicates
the victim while ensuring that the wrongdoer gets no more than
he deserves.
There are four related and significant problems with this
version of corrective justice that any corrective justice theorist
worth her salt is going to have to address. First, in what sense is
a corrective justice theory, construed as the objectivist would
construe it, different from a retributive justice theory, which
holds that the punishment of an offender is justified if and only if
the offender deserves the punishment?' If victims are (objec-
tively) vindicated if and only if their offenders receive their just
deserts (as measured by whether their unjust enrichment was
eradicated)--regardless of whether victims feel vindicated or are
in any appreciable way psychologically restored as a result of the
punishment-then it would seem that corrective justice theory is
not an autonomous theory of punishment, for it cannot justify
anything other than what is otherwise justified by retributivism.
Second, how, and by what objective measure, is an offender
unjustly enriched by a crime? It is easy to characterize a theft as
a crime of unjust enrichment: one who steals a million dollar
Ming vase has unjustly enriched himself by a million dollars, and
his victim is vindicated when the vase or its value has been re-
stored to him. But how are we to characterize and measure the
unjust enrichment of the kidnapper, the traitor, the rapist, and
the vandal?
Third, in what sense could the imprisonment of such offend-
ers go any distance toward returning their victims to their ex
ante positions? One understands how dollars could go some dis-
tance towards achieving compensation, since dollars have some
ability-albeit imperfect-to buy back what might have been sto-
len from the victim through the crime (her health, psychic re-
pose, lost earnings, and so on). But, of course, this is the task of
tort law. If corrective justice theory is going to constitute a the-
ory of criminal punishment that does not, by its own logic, spell
the collapse of criminal law into tort law, then it is going to have
4 See Part I-E for a discussion of the retributive theory of punishment.
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to explain how an offender's years in prison disgorge to his victim
something that goes some distance toward making her whole
again, and that does so in a manner that cannot better be accom-
plished through tort damages.
Finally, this task of connecting punishment to just compen-
sation might be an intelligible one if the corrective justice theo-
rist were to invoke a subjective measure of the punishment re-
quired to achieve the vindication of the victim. Then, the ques-
tion would be analogous to the one that is, in principle, asked in
tort law in order to fix the appropriate level of damages: namely,
at what point would the plaintiff have been indifferent between
the harm done to her and a cash payment? It is the plaintiff's
subjective indifference curve that provides the most promising
measure of when and how a given damage award makes her
whole, such that she is no worse off by virtue of having been
harmed and compensated than she would have been had the
harm (and ensuing compensation) never occurred. But if there
comes a point at which a person would be indifferent between
keeping her hand and receiving dollars for its loss, it is hard to
imagine that there is any meaning in the suggestion that persons
(at least those devoid of masochistic tendencies) would ever be
indifferent between retaining bodily security and seeing someone
punished for its loss.
Of course, even if we can solve some of the problems that be-
set a corrective justice theory by returning to a subjective meas-
ure of the punishment necessary to achieve a victim's vindica-
tion, we are returned to the problem that imposing punishment
proportionate to the subjective needs of victims invites the pros-
pect of gross over-punishment, for victims may not rest easy un-
til their assailants are made to suffer from quite Draconian
measures.
And just as a subjective measure permits over-punishment,
so it also permits what most would think of as intolerable under-
punishment. Suppose that a victim denies any need for vindica-
tion. Citing the virtue of turning the other cheek, she implores
the court not to punish her own brutal rapist. In the face of her
manifest lack of need for vindication (indeed, in the face of her
manifest need to recover her dignity by being merciful to one who
showed her no mercy), ought the court to let her assailant go
free? It would seem that there is simply no getting around the
haunting problem that corrective justice theories, by their atten-
tion to what it would take to permit the victim the kind of psy-
chic repose she enjoyed prior to the offense, appear to license
punishments disproportionate to desert.
[2005:408
EXPRESSIVISM
B. Rehabilitation Theory
On a rehabilitation theory, punishment is justified if and
only if it accomplishes a metamorphosis in the personality of the
offender so as to make him a socially functional participant in
the moral community.5 The concern of the rehabilitationist is the
moral transformation of the offender, and the roots of his theory
concerning the justifiable goals of the criminal justice system lie
deep in a perfectionist theory of legislation. On such a theory, the
power of the state is properly directed toward the goal of perfect-
ing persons morally. Perfectionists consider it legitimate for the
state to enact legislation that will make us more virtuous and
less vicious by nurturing in us charitable, kind, and courageous
dispositions, and suppressing selfish, cruel, and bigoted disposi-
tions. In the context of criminal law, this general political phi-
losophy inclines theorists to the view that suffering can be justi-
fied if, but only if, it is motivated by the promise of improving the
moral character of offenders.
It is crucial to be clear at the start that anyone who seeks to
rehabilitate offenders because it will deter them from further
wrongdoing and so make the rest of us safer, or because it will
return them to the pool of productive, contributing citizens and
so increase the wealth and well-being of all, is not a true reha-
bilitationist. Such a theorist is a utilitarian who conceives of the
rehabilitation of offenders as an instrumentally effective means
of maximizing social utility overall, but who is not principally
interested in the moral welfare of the offender. In contrast, a
true rehabilitationist is someone who takes the rehabilitation of
the offender to be an intrinsic good, and who is prepared to sacri-
fice social utility in order to achieve that end.
We can thus imagine two systems of punishment that
equally deter crime. One does so by Draconian means, making
punishment so gruesome that would-be offenders are frightened
out of acting on their wicked motivations. The other does so by
rehabilitating offenders, purging them of their desires to pursue
5 See, for example, Herbert Morris, A Paternahstic Theory ofPkmishmenA in Jeffrie
G. Murphy, ed, Punishment and Rehabilitation 154-68 (Wadsworth 3d ed 1995) (arguing
that the moral good of the wrongdoer ought to count heavily in the moral legitimacy of
punishment); Karl Menninger, The Crime of Pumishment 17-18 (Viking 1969) (character-
izing crimes as analogous to diseases and criminals as in need of cures, not "justice"); B.F.
Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity 81 (Knopf 1971) (arguing that the task of the
criminal justice system "is to make life less punishing and in doing so to release for more
reinforcing activities the time and energy consumed in the avoidance of punishment").
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criminal ends and substituting motivations of a virtuous sort.6
Imagine that the second system is three times more expensive
than the first. The utilitarian will opt for the first, for her ends
are thereby accomplished through minimally costly means, thus
maximizing social utility summed over all citizens. The rehabili-
tationist will opt for the second, for only it accomplishes the ends
that he believes are justifiably pursued by the criminal justice
system.
The prospect that true moral rehabilitation would be far
more expensive than other means of deterrence is hardly unreal-
istic, given how difficult it is for any of us to change our stripes.
But costliness, while of substantial legitimate concern to the
utilitarian (and to anyone who takes it to be a side-constraint on
the systematic pursuit of justice) is not the only problem that
threatens the rehabilitation theory.
Consider the moral of the following story. In 1958, John
Lynch was convicted of indecent exposure for engaging in mas-
turbation while at a drive-in hamburger joint.7 That offense was
treated as a simple misdemeanor, eligible for no more than brief
jail time or a small fine.8 In 1967, he was again convicted of the
same offense under similar circumstances. This time he was eli-
gible for a life sentence under California Penal Code § 314.' Cali-
fornia had pioneered indeterminate sentencing schemes moti-
vated by an "enlightened" desire to rehabilitate offenders, rather
than to punish them, and had legislated an indeterminate sen-
tence of one year to life for second-offense indecent exposure.1°
The state's theory was that offenders should spend as much or as
little time in prison as was necessary to alter their unfortunate
dispositions. As the California Supreme Court in In re Lynch
recognized, this scheme, and the rehabilitative theory that moti-
6 This thought experiment is drawn from Michael S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry;
Rethinking the Relationship 234-35 (Cambridge 1984), reprinted in Leo Katz, Michael S.
Moore, and Stephen Morse, eds, Foundations of Criminal Law 60, 61 (Oxford 1999).
7 In re Lynch, 503 P2d 921, 939-40 (Cal 1972).
8 Cal Penal Code § 314 (West 1970). Mr. Lynch received two years of probation for
his first offense. Lynch, 503 P2d at 922-23.
9 Cal Penal Code § 314 (West 1970), repealed in relevant part by the Uniform De-
terminate Sentencing Act (1976), codified primarily at Cal Penal Code § 1170 and in other
various sections (West 2004 & Supp 2005). At the time of Mr. Lynch's second offense, §
314 read, "Upon the second and each subsequent conviction [for indecent exposure], every
person so convicted is guilty of a felony, and is punishable by imprisonment in state
prison for not less than one year." Cal Penal Code § 314 (West 1970). See also People v
Caddick, 160 Cal App 3d 46, 51-52 (1984) (describing the history of indeterminate sen-
tencing in California).
10 Cal Penal Code § 314; Cal Penal Code § 1168.
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vated it, would readily permit someone who had twice exposed
himself to serve many times more years in prison than someone
who committed manslaughter, robbery, mayhem, and many dif-
ferent kinds of violent assault"-not because indecent exposure
is a grave wrong, but because its motivations may be difficult to
purge 2 (as § 314 of the California Penal Code clearly antici-
pated). If it would indeed have taken twenty-five years to alter
Mr. Lynch's proclivities, then the rehabilitationist can have no
complaint about incarcerating him for twenty-five years in re-
sponse to two episodes of public exposure!
Lynch teaches the lesson that rehabilitationism has no in-
ternal check on the amount of punishment that can be imposed
on offenders, save its efficaciousness in altering character. Reha-
bilitationism thus permits incarceration that may far exceed (or
fall far short of) what an offender deserves. Now consider a tale
that illustrates that the theory has no internal check on the na-
ture of treatment that can be delivered, save efficacy of character
modification.
In the 1970s, staff at the Vacaville facility in California em-
ployed the drug anectine as a means of achieving aversion ther-
apy.'3 Anectine paralyzes the involuntary motor muscles that
control the lungs, and so generates an acute and quite terrifying
sense of suffocation. After receiving anectine injections in tan-
dem with lectures on the wickedness of their ways, offenders
found that they would become breathless, very anxious, and
sometimes phobic in any circumstance that invited the prospect
of their recidivism. Their rule infractions dropped by 30 per-
cent,14 proving anectine a powerful means of altering the motiva-
tions of would-be recidivists. Inasmuch as character is simply a
function of motivation, those who would embrace a rehabilita-
tionist theory of punishment must seemingly regard such drug-
therapy with favor. Their compelled enthusiasm, however, re-
veals that not only does rehabilitationism lack checks on the
amount of punishment that can be imposed; it also lacks checks
on the kind of punishment that can be imposed.
1 Id at 935-38.
12 Id at 925.
13 See Roy G. Spece, Jr., Note, Conditioning and Other Techniques Used to "Treat?"
"Rehabilitate?" 'Demolish? Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S Cal L Rev 616, 633-38
(1972) (describing the program at Vacaville and the effects of anectine).
14 Id at 636-37.
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C. Utilitarian Theory
The utilitarian's guiding concern is to maximize social utility
summed across all members of society. Her theory thus takes
punishment to be justified if and only if the pain or disutility im-
posed upon the offender is outweighed by a net gain of utility to
others.15 The utility that may be achieved by punishing offenders
can take many forms, and it is commonplace for people to ad-
vance several reasons for punishment without clearly appreciat-
ing that they all presuppose a commitment to a utilitarian the-
ory. An offender's incarceration by itself can prevent further
wrongdoing during the duration of the incarceration, and it is
commonly hoped and claimed that incarceration is sufficiently
unpleasant to deter recidivism after an offender's release. The
punishment of an offender may also effectively deter other
would-be offenders by giving proof that crime does not pay. Pun-
ishment may serve to educate those who are motivated to be law-
abiding but who also need clear guidance concerning the law's
demands so as to deter them from crime less by threat than by
education. The imposition of pain on those who have caused pain
may prove cathartic for the many who are outraged at the crimi-
nal act, and so may yield increased utility. Those who would oth-
erwise resort to vigilante justice may be deterred from taking the
law into their own hands if the law is quick to avenge their
losses. And finally, punishment may reaffirm the social contract,
providing assurances to those who sacrifice liberty by abiding by
the law that they are not being played for fools by free-riders who
would have the gains of cooperation without the reciprocal costs.
Given how terribly common claims of these kinds are
amongst theorists and laypersons alike, it is important for crimi-
nal law theorists to acknowledge the problems that beset the
theory of punishment upon which they rely. By its very terms, a
utilitarian theory is committed, in principle, to permitting the
punishment of an innocent person and the acquittal of a guilty
assailant. For if the visible punishment of a person known by a
judge to be innocent will deter those who would be eager to of-
fend, educate those who are morally ignorant, reinforce the social
15 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
170-71 (Prometheus 1988) ("Upon the principle of utility, if [punishment] ought at all to
be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater
evil."); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum L Rev
1193, 1205-14 (1985) (finding that criminal liability is imposed for acts that violate the
rules of consensual transfers).
[2005:412
EXPRESSIVISM
contract between those whose law-abidingness depends upon it,
reduce vigilantism by those tempted by it, and achieve other so-
cial gains that collectively outweigh the costs of undeserved pun-
ishment to the person falsely accused, then the utilitarian theory
will demand such punishment. Only doubt about predicted con-
sequences slows the utilitarian. In a case in which the conse-
quences are clear, the right thing to do is whatever will yield a
net gain in social utility. Hence, where a judge can predict that
social utility will be maximized by punishing an innocent person,
he should punish the innocent and take cost-efficient means of
preventing knowledge of his deed.
Similarly, of course, when social gains may be achieved by
allowing a guilty person to go free, the utilitarian takes no of-
fense at recommending that result. Thus, if greater racial har-
mony was achieved by the acquittal of O.J. Simpson, and that
benefit outweighed the social disutility that accrued from the
decision, then the utilitarian would applaud the outcome of that
famous criminal case, even if she were convinced that Simpson
was in fact guilty of the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and
Ron Goldman. Once again, only uncertainty concerning conse-
quences gives a utilitarian pause: nothing inherent in the theory
in principle precludes gross under- and over-punishment.
Indeed, the theory commits one to thinking that the optimal
state of affairs would be achieved if the guilty were indeed ap-
prehended, tried, and condemned very publicly, but then secretly
given new identities in happy circumstances or treated to an en-
viable existence in a remote tropical location. Were we success-
fully to pretend to punish the guilty (while in fact treating them
to a life that they would prefer), we would achieve all the gains
that the utilitarian seeks from punishment without any of the
disutility that punishment imposes on the offender. Inasmuch as
the disutility of the offender is of moral relevance to the utilitar-
ian, her theory, by its own terms, favors a reduction (and, if pos-
sible, an elimination) of punishment when its gains can be
achieved through other, less costly means-most plausibly
through the ruse of punishment.
D. Mixed (Retributive/Utilitarian) Theory
The fourth philosophical perspective on punishment repre-
sents an attempt to repair the problem raised for utilitarianism.
It is the perspective of the so-called "mixed theorist," who takes
an offender's just deserts to cap the amount of punishment le-
gitimately imposed on the offender, but who insists that punish-
413405]
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ment is justified only if it also accomplishes a net gain in social
utility. On this theory, then, utility is the accelerator and desert
is the brake. Persons may not be punished if they are undeserv-
ing, and they may not be punished more than they deserve, but
they ought not to be punished if no social gain can be achieved
through their pain.
One hears expressions of this theory quite commonly, when,
for example, people ask what good it will do to punish someone
who is old, ill, or repentant. Very elderly Nazi war criminals, who
have only recently been discovered to have lived innocuous lives
for decades under assumed identities, often garner surprising
sympathy from people who simply see no social utility in punish-
ing them all these years after their youthful atrocities.
While the mixed theory escapes the prospect of theoretically
vindicating the punishment of the innocent, it surely fails to cor-
rect for the other two interrelated problems that, in my view,
defeat the theoretical defensibility of utilitarianism. Suppose
that a brutal rapist finds God and is born again, so as to believa-
bly pose no threat of returning to his criminal ways. Suppose also
that the mere pretense of his punishment will suffice to accom-
plish the other goals that might be socially useful: the deterrence
of other would-be rapists, the reinforcement of the social con-
tract, the moral education of the general public, and so on.
Should he nevertheless be punished?
The answer of the mixed theorist must be "no." If no good
will come of his punishment, or if the good that would come of it
can be accomplished through pretending to punish him rather
than actually punishing him, then the right thing to do is to let
him go free (and indeed, to invest cost-efficient resources in help-
ing him to do so, so as to maximize utility summed across all
members of the community, including the rapist). So the problem
is this: a mixed theory of punishment does not demand that
offenders get their just deserts. It simply demands that they get
no more than their just deserts.
E. Retributive Theory
The retributivist takes punishment to be justified if and only
if it accords an offender his just deserts. 6 On this theory, desert
is both necessary and sufficient for punishment. Punishment
16 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 100-02 (Bobbs-Merrill
1965) (John Ladd, trans); Moore, Law and Psychiatry at 236 (cited in note 6). See also
Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence 33-36 (California 1976).
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should never be imposed on one who is undeserving, or in an
amount that is undeserved; but when punishment is deserved, no
greater gain need be sought than to administer it in proportion
to the culpable wrongdoing of the offender.
This theory clearly answers the concerns about under- and
over-punishment raised by the previous theories, for it makes
desert the touchstone of justifiable sanctions. Those who doubt
that it is an intrinsic good to accord persons their just deserts
may continue to be skeptical about the justifiability of devoting
resources toward the punishment of the guilty absent larger so-
cial gains, but such a complaint simply returns critics to the task
of defending the utilitarian or mixed theory presupposed by their
skepticism.
Retributivism is not without its puzzles, however, and it
seems to me that the greatest one is the question of whether it
can defend, in any principled way, claims about the proportional-
ity of particular punishments to the particular harms culpably
caused by particular offenders.
The principle of Lex Talionis is a powerful answer to the
challenge that punishments cannot be matched to offenses: it
straightforwardly demands an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,
and a life for a life. Surely to get back what you give is the most
intuitive notion of getting your just deserts.
But no retributivist would embrace the claim that the state
ought generally to be in the business of perpetrating the horrors
on offenders that match in kind the horrors that they perpe-
trated on their innocent victims. No one in today's academy be-
lieves that the state ought to satisfy the demands of retributiv-
ism by torturing the torturer, raping the rapist, or flashing the
flasher. And what would it even mean to be treasonous to the
traitor?
Yet once the retributivist leaves a principle that exactly
matches punishment to offense, what allows the retributivist to
say that seven months, or seven years, or seventeen years, is the
just reward of one who commits tax fraud? What principle works
to match differential losses of liberty with crimes of differential
severity?
The traditional answer of the retributivist is to reject the
claim implicit in this criticism that punishments must be abso-
lutely proportionate to their punishments. Instead, the answer
goes, punishments are justified if they are comparatively propor-
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tionate to their crimes. 7 Accordingly, if crimes are rank-ordered
from most serious to least serious-from murder to double-
parking-and if punishments are then assigned to each crime in
descending order of severity, then it is immaterial whether tax
fraud gets seven years or seventeen years, so long as it gets the
same punishment as identically-serious crimes, less punishment
than the next most serious crime, and greater punishment than
the next less serious crime. That seventeen years in prison may
not match our Platonic conception of what tax fraud merits is not
a legitimate complaint if embezzlement receives twenty years
and mail fraud fourteen years, and tax fraud is proportionately
more serious than the latter and less serious than the former;
and so on with regard to all other crimes, from the least serious
to the most serious.
Perhaps by repairing to comparative proportionality the re-
tributivist can allay fears of moral arbitrariness. Certainly, to
the extent that just punishment is largely a function of equal
treatment, a system of comparative proportionality will ensure
that like cases are treated alike, and different cases are treated
proportionately differently.
But I find the retributivist's often blithe assumption that
comparative proportionality will rescue him from arbitrariness to
be optimistic at best, and hypocritical at worst. Imagine a society
that articulates and enforces very few criminal prohibitions. It
makes it criminal to murder, rape, kidnap, commit theft, engage
in vandalism, or defame another's good name (considering it as
serious to "steal" another's reputation as to steal his television).
It condemns murderers to death, gives a life sentence for rape,
and gives fifty years for kidnapping, forty-five years for theft,
forty years for defamation, and thirty-five years for vandalism.
Could a gossip legitimately complain when imprisoned for forty
years for falsely calling her neighbor dishonest? It would seem
not, at least if the test of just punishment is whether the crime is
punished proportionately to other crimes. For while it would
seem, in absolute terms, extraordinary to be locked away for the
bulk of one's productive life for a petty slur, one cannot complain
that the punishment is disproportionate to other punishments.
But inasmuch as the moral force of the retributivist's theory lies
17 See, for example, State v Benn, 845 P2d 289, 324 (Wash 1993) (holding that Benn's
sentence was comparatively proportionate to other sentences for similar crimes). See also
John Kleinig, Punishment and Desert 115-16 (Martinus Nijhoff 1973) (describing the
argument that punishments are just if crimes are scaled from most to least deserving of
punishment and then matched to a ranking of the harshness of punishments).
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in its concern for matching punishments to just deserts, it seems
a fatal flaw to then declare that judgments of comparative pro-
portionality are close enough for government work!
II. EXPRESSIVISM: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE?
The chronic inability of punishment theorists to solve the
problems inherent in the five traditional perspectives on pun-
ishment that I have outlined has motivated a number of contem-
porary criminal law theorists to seek new philosophical founda-
tions for the institution of punishment. Today's most fashionable
contender is that of the self-described expressivist, who main-
tains that punishment is justified if and only if it properly de-
nounces or contradicts the social meaning of an offender's ac-
tions."8 On this theory, we are to view criminal activity as ex-
pressing a message or having what is called "social meaning,"
and we are to view the role of punishment as contradicting that
message. Both crime and punishment are thus thought to be
communicative exercises. As Dan Kahan has written,
On expressive grounds serious crimes strike us as such-
that is, as crimes and as serious--not just because they
impair another's interests, but because they convey that
the wrongdoer doesn't respect the true value of things. To
express condemnation, then, society must respond with a
form of punishment that unequivocally evinces the com-
munity's repudiation of the wrongdoer's valuations.1 9
One who is attracted to this new expressivism has the task
of answering both conceptual and moral questions, and it is to
these questions that I want to devote the remainder of this arti-
cle. Conceptually, the expressivist must be able to make sense of
what it means to say that criminal deeds and their punishments
have "social meanings," such that punishments can be employed
strategically to contradict the insults communicated by offenses
(Part A below). Morally, the expressivist must be able to moti-
vate the claim that communicating messages that contradict
those of criminals is intrinsically good (not just instrumentally
18 See, for example, Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96
Mich L Rev 1621 (1998) (arguing that persons' "disgust sensibility" explains many other-
wise puzzling facets of criminal law-such as the fact that imprisonment is the preferred
alternative for punishment in America-because they are centered on the question of
what acts deserve to be the objects of social expressions of disgust).
19 Id at 1641 (emphasis in original).
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good) (Part B below), and is so good that it sometimes justifies
punishing persons more than they deserve (Part C below), and
less than they deserve (Part D below).
A. Making Conceptual Sense of the "Social Meaning" of Crimes
and Punishments
The first question that an expressivist must answer is this:
How are we to extract the message embodied in a given criminal
action so as to know how to craft punishment in a way that will
contradict it? One might begin by hypothesizing, plausibly
enough, that crimes can be thought to have what H.P. Grice
termed "natural meaning": they are symptoms of natural phe-
nomena to which they are causally related." Just as we say that
a sneeze "means" that one has a cold, a clap of thunder "means"
that a storm is brewing, and a loud exclamation "means" that
one is surprised, so we might think that a crime "means" what-
ever it is to which it is causally connected.21 On this conception,
seeking the meaning of a crime is like seeking the meaning of red
spots on someone's skin: one does not inquire into anyone's in-
tentions; rather one seeks to determine phenomena of which
these effects are symptomatic. Thus one might say that "the
spots mean measles,"22 and "his crime means he was jealous, or
his wife left him, or unemployment breeds desperation." In nei-
ther case, however, has one characterized either his spots or his
deeds as communicative acts, despite their being what Grice
termed natural "signs. "23
It is not worth denying that crimes can be signs in the
Gricean sense. Indeed, they evidence a great many important
background causes and so might take their "natural meaning(s)"
from any and all those contributors-economic, social, psycho-
logical, physiological, and so forth. But expressivists could hardly
equate the social meanings of crimes with their natural mean-
20 H.P. Grice, Meaning, in Jay F. Rosenberg and Charles Travis, eds, Readings in the
Philosophy of Language 436, 437 (Prentice-Hall 1971).
21 This evidential construal is articulated by one perspicuous critic of expressivism,
Matt Adler. See Matthew D. Adler, Expression and Appearance: A Comment on Heilman,
60 Md L Rev 688, 708 (2001); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U Pa L Rev 1363, 1384-85 (2000). For a general discussion of nonlinguistic
meaning, see Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 Yale L J 945, 953-54 (1990);
Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Expression," and the Multiple
Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U Pa L Rev
1577 (2000).
22 Grice, Meaning at 436 (cited in note 20).
23 Id at 438.
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ings, both because there are as many natural meanings of a
given crime as there are causes (making it entirely accurate to
say that "the murder meant a blood sugar shortage"), and be-
cause the natural meaning of a crime would never have false
propositional content that invites or demands contradiction. Only
if crimes can "say" false things can they-and perhaps, then,
should they-be contradicted. Inasmuch as effects cannot lie
about their causes-and a crime has the natural meanings that
it does only by virtue of the causes of which it is, in fact, an ef-
fect-they cannot be construed as false propositions in need of
correction.
This is to say, then, that expressivists must construe crimes
as communications of a sort--as "signals" possessed of non-
natural meaning, or "meaningN,"24 rather than as "signs" pos-
sessed of natural meaning. Only if crimes are construed as inten-
tional human communications can they possess propositional
content of questionable truth value that would merit efforts of
falsification by others. We are thus naturally compelled to turn
to classic communication theory in order to make sense of how a
crime could constitute a communication possessing Gricean
"meaningNN."
On the standard view, communication requires what J.L.
Austin referred to as an "illocutionary speech act."25 An illocu-
tionary speech act is performed whenever one utters a sentence
or performs an action that has particular "conventional force"
indicating what one is intending to convey by one's utterance or
action.26 This communication typically involves three elements.27
First, one who communicates means something by his ac-
tion-his action has what linguists call speaker's, or utterer's,
24 Id at 437.
25 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 109 (Harvard 1975).
26 Id at 103, 109. Illocutionary acts are performances of acts in saying something. Id
at 99. Telling someone that her house is on fire, for example, is an illocutionary act be-
cause A is warning B of danger. Id at 103-04. So, for example, I can say "I advise you to
go to the store," but I cannot say, "I convince you to go to the store" (because the latter is
a "perlocutionary" act that requires participation from B, in which the performance of the
act is done by saying it). Id at 101-04.
27 For a classic summary of the elements of communication, see Grice, Meaning at
441 (cited in note 20). For an appreciation of the extent to which Grice's analysis of the
conditions of communication has been accepted as definitive by those who work in com-
munication theory and the philosophy of language, see Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning: An
Introduction to a Philosophy of Language 86-88 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979); Robert
Martin, The Meaning of Language 83-95 (MIT 1987); Peter Strawson, Logico-Linguistic
Papers 155-58 (Metheun 1971); John Searle, What is a Speech Act?, in Rosenberg and
Travis, eds, Readings in the Philosophy of Language at 620 (cited in note 20).
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meaning." Second, a rational communicator will typically choose
conventional means of expressing his message. In linguistics,
such conventions are often (if controversially) divided into se-
mantic conventions (giving the meaning of words, symbols, and
sentences) and pragmatic conventions (giving the norms of ap-
propriate utterance). Finally, when the beliefs of the audience
match the intentions of the speaker-so as to achieve what J.L.
Austin called audience "uptake"2 9-then communication has suc-
ceeded." If crimes can be understood communicatively, then they
should adhere, at least roughly, to this model of communication.
It should be clear from this briefest of surveys that the ex-
pressivist's claim that crimes convey messages cannot be vindi-
cated by easily applying the standard model of communication.
For it seems obvious that criminal deeds are generally not illocu-
tionary acts: they do not represent conventional means by which
speakers seek ways of conveying particular messages. In the tri-
partite sense in which communication theorists think of commu-
nications, crimes fail to satisfy the first criterion, for they fail to
possess "speaker's meaning."
Some criminal actions, of course, are calculated to send a
message to their victims. Certain hate crimes, for example,
might be thought to be strategically designed to be substitutes
for raw threats: they are perpetrated with the intent to commu-
nicate to victims clear messages of contempt and clear warnings
concerning their long-term safety within the community."' But
far more often, crimes have no such illocutionary intentions be-
hind them. Murderers often kill and rapists often rape without
intending that their victims achieve audience uptake of any sort.
Their goals are to kill and rape, not to talk. Their crimes cannot
be thought to have "speaker's meaning" because there is nothing
that they mean bythem.
The next move open to the expressivist is to invoke the third
element of a full-fledged theory of communication-the element
28 The concept of speaker's meaning again finds its basis in the work of H.P. Grice.
See Grice, Meaning at 386 (cited in note 20) (describing the "utterer's intention"). J.L.
Austin called an actor's meaning the actor's "locutionary act." Austin, How to Do Things
with Words at 94 (cited in note 25). And Michael Moore has termed it the speaker's "se-
mantic intention." Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterprettion, 58 S Cal L
Rev 277, 340-44 (1985).
29 Audience "uptake" occurs when the audience understands the meaning and the
force of the locution. Austin, How to Do Things with Words at 116-17 (cited in note 25).
30 Heidi M. Hurd and Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 Stan L
Rev 1081, 1102 (2004). Moore, 58 S Cal L Rev at 340-44 (cited in note 28).
31 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions MeanZ 63 U Chi L Rev 591, 598
(1996).
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of audience belief. As the argument would go, crimes have mean-
ing to the extent that those who are audiences to them attribute
meaning to them. Thus, if an audience takes a grisly murder to
possess meaning-attributing to it, for example, the proposition
that the victim's life was of no worth-then the crime has mean-
ingNs. And if the proposition for which the audience takes the
crime to stand is deemed false, then the expressivist could claim
that punishment should be imposed in a manner that will cause
that same audience to reach a contradictory judgment from that
proffered by the crime.
It is far from nonsensical to attribute a meaning to an action
solely on the basis of how an audience understands that action.
Audience-oriented interpretation is well established and makes
good sense in several legal contexts, including defining what
counts as defamation,32 establishing a violation of the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act,3" or fixing the meaning of a contract. Thus, for
example, whether a defendant's statement is slanderous to a
plaintiff turns on whether at least a significant minority of the
community (a "Peck audience"'), if not a majority, takes it to be
of and concerning the plaintiff and is inclined to subject the
plaintiff to ridicule and contempt as a result of it.35 That the de-
fendant did not intend the statement to be about the plaintiff or
to be besmirching to reputation is neither here nor there, pro-
vided that others take its reference to pick out the plaintiff and
take it to be derogatory.
There are, however, two problems with invoking defamation
law's concept of audience understanding in order to fix the social
meaning of a crime. First, how should we fix the audience to a
criminal's actions so as to extract the social meaning of those ac-
32 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1965) ("A communication is defamatory if
it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community."); West v Thomson Newspapers, 872 P2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994) (stating that
the guiding principle in whether a statement is defamatory, aside from its truth, "is the
statement's tendency to injure a reputation in the eyes of its audience").
33 15 USC §§ 1041-1127 (2000). The Lanham Trade-Mark Act authorizes the Director
of the Patent and Trademark Office to deny a trademark registration if she determines
that the public is likely to confuse it with another registered trademark. 15 USC §
1052(d). The Lanham Act also creates a civil cause of action if a person uses in commerce
any misleading description of fact which is likely to deceive, cause confusion, or cause
mistake in regards to affiliation with another person's brand of merchandise. 15 USC §
1125(a).
34 Peck v Tribune Co, 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
35 Id at 189-90 (holding that "general consensus" is not necessary to prove libel;
instead, plaintiff must only prove that the alleged libel "will be known by a large number
and will lead an appreciable fraction of that number to regard the plaintiff with con-
tempt").
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tions from the audience's understanding of them? It will not do to
adopt a majoritarian measure, unless we are truly prepared to
say that slavery is not derogatory so long as the majority does
not think of it as such. And if we are prepared to say that an ac-
tion has a given social meaning if a minority would take it as
such, then many criminal deeds may have two or more social
meanings of contradictory propositional content. The social
meaning, for example, of the gang member's crime may be
deemed laudatory by his gang, while being perceived as an ex-
pression of contempt by the victim's community. Which meaning
are we to privilege?
Second, it seems close to impossible to attribute any discrete
meaning to a given crime that distinguishes it in its meaning-
and so in its punishment-from other crimes. Just try it. Imag-
ine that a drunk driver takes the outside corner of a blind curve,
but avoids hitting anyone. You are an audience to his reckless-
ness. What (false?) proposition do you attribute to his deed? And
how does that proposition differ from those propositions that you
assign to car thefts, muggings, tax evasion, speeding offenses, or
acts of petty vandalism? If these crimes do not possess quite dif-
ferent and quite specific meanings in your mind-if you cannot
attribute to them particular propositions concerning their vic-
tims-then in what sense could you craft specific punishments
that would contradict, with precision, the terms of the messages
sent by these crimes?
As I have tried to craft examples that will sympathetically il-
lustrate the expressivist's thesis within this paper, I have found
myself repeatedly throwing up my proverbial hands and simply
describing a particular crime as conveying "disrespect for the
victim." But unless a rape is properly punished the same as a
petty theft (and vice versa)-because in the end both crimes con-
vey an identical message of disrespect for their victims-the no-
tion that crimes possess distinct meanings by virtue of Peck au-
diences assigning to them distinct propositions is more meta-
phorical than meaningful.
The third possibility that the expressivist might pursue in
making sense of the social meanings of crimes-and thus pun-
ishments-is to take the conventions that make communication
possible as the locus of meaning. After all, communication be-
tween persons reflects a very significant coordination problem
that can be, and has been, solved only by the development of
shared conventions. Consider the familiar example of a novel
typed by the 500,000th monkey in the British Museum whose
random tapping of keys miraculously produces not only syntacti-
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cally correct sentences but also strings of them with theme, nar-
rative consistency, interesting plot development, and so on. The
product of the monkey's random typewriter tapping has meaning
even if we must admit that no one wrote it and even if no one
reads it. Its meaning derives from its conformity to the semantic,
pragmatic, and stylistic conventions that attend novelistic utter-
ances in English.
It might be argued then, that the social meaning of crimes is
given by whatever conventions they reflect-regardless of
whether the offender intends to invoke those conventions, and
regardless of whether the victim--or anyone else-in fact per-
ceives the message accordingly. An action is racist if it invokes
norms that have historically been employed to communicate
messages of bigotry; an action is chauvinistic if it participates in
conventions that have been historically employed to reinforce
gender distinctions; and so forth. Thus, even if a defendant had
no knowledge of the conventions associated with spray-painting
a swastika-like symbol on a synagogue, his act would have anti-
Semitic meaning, because conventions alone give it that mean-
ing-even if no one experiences it as anti-Semitic, and despite its
not being intended as such.
The problem with an effort to derive social meaning from the
second element of the standard account of communications is
that conventions are famously under- and over-determinate.
What is the conventional meaning, for example, of a man's pull-
ing out a chair for a woman? Does it honor her or disrespect her?
Since the act simultaneously participates in or draws upon a
multitude of conventions-some honorific, some oppressive-it is
extraordinarily hard to fix its social meaning through these so-
cial conventions. While a swastika has quite clear connotations,
few crimes employ symbols that have discrete meanings within
our language and culture. What particular, discrete conventions
are invoked by or reflected in drunk driving, illegal prostitution,
mail fraud, arson, and public exposure such that they can be em-
ployed to give these crimes meanings distinct from one another
and meanings that could be contradicted by particular punish-
ments?
These problems, it seems to me, are sufficient to suggest
that expressivists need a theory of social meaning that divorces
meaning from the illocutionary intentions of offenders-that is,
from speakers' intentions; the beliefs of victims or witnesses-
that is, from audience beliefs; and social norms-that is, from
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semantic and pragmatic conventions. As I have discussed in sub-
stantial detail elsewhere,36 many expressivists remarkably seem
to think that they can build such a theory without any of these
theoretical blocks. In a leading article on legal expressivism
Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes tell us that public mean-
ing "need not be in the agent's head, the recipient's head, or even
in the heads of the general public."37 They offer the following ex-
ample: "Musicians can play music that expresses sadness, with-
out feeling sad themselves. The music they play need not express
their (or anyone's) sadness: the sadness is in the music itself."3
It is surely true that music can express sadness without the
composer being sad at the time that she wrote it, and without the
musicians themselves feeling sad at the time that they play it. It
can also express sadness without an audience on a given occasion
being caused either to feel sad or to believe that the music is sad.
But can music express sadness if the music conforms to no musi-
cal conventions associated with the conveyance of a sad mood, so
that it has no propensity whatsoever to elicit these cognitive or
emotional experiences in audiences? Without actual mental
states on the part of authors or audience members, and without
any norms abstracted from other authors and other audiences
reacting to different, but relevantly similar, kinds of music, in
what possible sense could music be sad or conveyor express sad-
ness?
3 9
Let us consider three possibilities. The first has been sug-
gested by Simon Blackburn in his efforts to ascribe some sensible
meaning to the expressivists' notion of social meaning.4 ° Black-
burn offers expressivists what he calls a "credibility" construal:
an action A expresses some meaning M when M is the only
credible motivation that an actor could rationally have had in
doing A.4 Thus, to use one of Blackburn's examples, the flying of
the Confederate flag over the government buildings in certain
36 Hurd and Moore, 56 Stan L Rev at 1106-10 (cited in note 30).
37 Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories ofLa w: A Gen-
eraflRestatement, 148 U Pa L Rev 1503, 1525 (2000).
38 Id at 1508.
39 See Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 60
Md L Rev 506, 562-63 (2001) (arguing that if the music in Anderson and Pildes's example
does not express sadness felt by anyone, then it makes no sense to call it "sad").
40 Simon Blackburn, Group Minds and Expressive Harm, 60 Md L Rev 467 (2001).
For a somewhat more extensive discussion of Blackburn's proposal, see Hurd and Moore,
56 Stan L Rev at 1107-08 (cited in note 30).
41 Blackburn, 60 Md L Rev at 483 (cited in note 40). Blackburn sometimes puts his
credibility account slightly differently: An action A expresses M when there is no credible
way that the actor could rationally engage in A without defending M.
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Southern states can be thought to expresses racism if the only
credible reason that a rational agent could have for flying such a
flag is to celebrate the racial hierarchy that characterized the
South in pre-Civil War days.42
Our problem, again, will be that the credibility condition ap-
pears likely to over- or under-determine the social meaning(s) of
an action. Whether it can uniquely determine the (rational) mo-
tive(s) to be attributed to an action depends on how stringent the
norms of rationality are taken to be. If one takes them to be very
stringent, then there may be but one rational end for a given ac-
tion. If one takes them to be very loose, however, then there may
be many possible motives for any action. Blackburn presumably
would intend the expressivist to couple his credibility construal
with a level of stringency that is taken to match the average in-
formation base, average inference-drawing capacities, and aver-
age intelligibility of desires of humankind.
Blackburn's construal of "social meaning" holds out the
promise of giving the concept sufficient content that it avoids
what Blackburn rightfully fears for it, namely, that "anything
goes 4 -- that is, that any meaning can be assigned to any crime
so as to justify any punishment. The solution that Blackburn of-
fers the expressivist, however, would make a defendant deserv-
ing of punishment not because of any fact about him or his deed,
but because of the appearance of some fact about him or his deed:
namely the appearance that he possessed a particular motivation
for his crime, regardless of whether he in fact possessed such a
motivation and regardless of whether anyone perceived him as
having such a motivation. To declare that a crime means what a
hypothetical rational actor would have meant by it had she per-
formed it under the circumstances-and to punish a defendant so
as to contradict that message-is to punish someone for the hy-
42 Id at 485. It is tempting to regard Blackburn's credibility construal of social mean-
ing as but another return to the subjective mental states of actors, the only novel twist
being a stringent evidentiary requirement for when an actor can be thought to possess a
mental state. Yet Blackburn plainly intends no such construal, for his aim is to provide a
notion of social meaning that can apply to groups and institutions that in no obvious
sense actually possess mental states. Blackburn's is a constructivist construal of social
meaning, one that is based on the mere appearance, and not the reality, of there being a
certain motivation. Such an appearance is generated by attributing rational beliefs and
rational inferences to the agent (or entity) whose act is thought to have social meaning
and asking (in light of the causal and other properties of the action, and in light of the
absence of any better means to achieve a certain state of affairs) what end could most
rationally have been achieved by such a means. Hurd and Moore, 56 Stan L Rev at 1107 n
68 (cited in note 30).
43 Blackburn, 60 Md L Rev at 478-79 (cited in note 40).
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pothetical and not for the real. If expressivists can live with this
result, then their theory likely has normative problems that will
swamp its conceptual problems.
The second construal of the concept of social meaning that
does not rely on authorial intentions, audience beliefs, or existing
communicative conventions is offered by Deborah Hellman in her
defense of an expressivist approach to equal protection analysis
in constitutional law.' Hellman appeals to audience beliefs in
her construal, but they are not the actual beliefs of crime victims,
witnesses, or consumers of current events. Rather, in her view,
we should decipher the hypothetical beliefs that a citizenry
would have if it were to engage in dialogue in a Habermasian
"ideal speech" situation. 5 As she puts it, "the expressive
dimension of a law or policy is best understood as the meaning
that we would arrive at if we were to discuss the interpretive
question together under fair conditions."46
It is unclear how an expressivist who seeks to make use of
this suggestion in the context of justifying criminal sanctions
would flesh out this claim. How would we fix the "fair conditions"
for a conversation about the "interpretive question" of the social
meaning of a criminal's action? Specifying such conditions,
however, is not the least of the problems that confront Hellman's
approach. The conclusion of such an idealized epistemic exercise
cannot even claim the relevance of an appearance of a bad
motivation. Such a conclusion can yield only the judgment that
there would be such an appearance in the idealized situation
imagined. It is morally unintelligible how one could conclude
that the state would be justified in punishing those whose crimes
would be viewed as sexist or racist by hypothetical people
engaged in certain idealized dialogues in another hypothetical
world.
A third possible unpacking of the expressivist's concept of
social meaning-one that does not rely on any of the standard
components of communication theory-is offered by another
44 Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 Minn L Rev
1 (2000).
45 Id. See Jurgen Habermas, Justiication and Application: Remarks on Discourse
Ethics 54-60 (MIT 1993) (Ciaran Cronin, trans) (arguing that the ideal speech situation
must include freedom of access, equal rights to participate, truthfulness on the part of
participants, absence of coercion in taking positions, and similar values). For an ex-
panded treatment of the ideal speech situation, see Jurgen Habermas, Moral Conscious-
ness and Communicative Action 83-94 (MIT 1990) (Christian Lenhardt and Shierry
Weber Nicholson, trans).
46 Hellman, 85 Minn L Rev at 23 (cited in note 44).
[2005:
EXPRESSISM
critic of expressivism, Steven Smith.4 7 Smith also engages in an
extensive search for a conception of social meaning that is
coherent and can do the normative work that it is assigned by
expressivists. 4' In exasperation, Smith concludes that
"expressivist scholars seem to suggest that laws or actions can
just have 'objective' meanings, period-meanings that need not
be meanings of or to anyone."49 Smith concludes that "this
assertion simply renders the notion of 'meaning' unintelligible." °
I agree with Smith's conclusion that those with expressivist
intuitions ultimately believe that social meaning is a primitive or
raw concept that is unresponsive to analysis. Certainly those
who wish to free themselves from the constraining implications
of the various theories concerning what social meanings can be-
theories framed in terms of intentions, beliefs, or conventions-
do seem to yearn for an account of meaning that gives it
metaphysical autonomy. The most flagrant example of one who
espouses this metaphysically primitive view of meaning is Edwin
Baker. 1 According to Baker, there is a "missing realm" of
existence that, once recognized, solves the problems that have
concerned us. 2 On his understanding, there is both the "material
realm" of the natural world and the "subjective realm" of the
mind; but there is, in addition, a "third realm": the "social
realm."53 Discovery of this realm solves the conceptual worry
concerning the locus of social meaning because "meaning exist[s]
here, in this social realm, not as [a] 'mental event[]' in the heads
of either creators or perceivers."" And this construal of social
meaning purportedly solves the normative worries that I have
registered in response to some attempts to fix social meaning,
because according to Baker, "a proper normative concern focuses
on 'meanings' that exist in the social realm."55 Baker concludes
that "an understanding of this 'social' realm is absolutely
47 Smith, 60 Md L Rev 506 (cited in note 39).
48 Id at 510-18.
49 Id at 562.
50 Id at 563.
"' See C. Edwin Baker, Injustice and the Normative Nature of Meaning, 60 Md L Rev
578 (2001) (detailing the merits of an expressivist jurisprudence that would prohibit the
government from acting in a manner that expresses a constitutionally forbidden
meaning). For a similar discussion of Baker's free-standing conception of meaning, see
Hurd and Moore, 56 Stan L Rev 1109-10 (cited in note 30).
52 Id at 583.
13 Id at 584-85.
14 Id at 586.
55 Baker, 60 Md L Rev at 585 (cited in note 51).
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fundamental to an understanding not only of meaning and
interpretation, but of the social sciences generally."56
But as one critic of metaphysical promiscuity has argued,
"special realms" are the last refuges of theories in trouble.57 One
who postulates metaphysical divides between the natural and
the moral, between the physical and the mental, or between the
individual and the social commits himself to what John Mackie
called "queer entities."" And as I have suggested elsewhere,59
once one commits oneself to metaphysical queerness, one is
surely committed to postulating queer relations between queer
and non-queer entities, and queer epistemological means of
gaining knowledge about such entities and their relations. And
even if we ignore all of these vintage objections to the kind of
pluralist metaphysics upon which Baker's view relies, we are
returned to Blackburn's fear that we have entered a
"hermeneutic desert," ° a landscape "where anything goes."6'
It would seem, then, that expressivism cannot deliver up a
concept of social meaning that is coherent and determinate in its
implications for particular cases. Absent a theory of how to
attribute meanings to crimes that are propositionally unique and
therefore capable of being "contradicted" by particular penalties,
expressivism will be unable to make sense of when and why
particular offenders ought to receive particular punishments.
Let us now leave the conceptual problems that confound
attempts to make sense of the expressions that expressivists
attribute to crimes and punishments and turn to two normative
questions that must be answered by those who take expressivism
to be an able contender within punishment theory.
B. Making Moral Sense of Using Punishments to "Contradict"
the Social Meaning of Crimes
Expressivists must think that it is good for society to express
its disapproval of crimes-indeed, so good as to justify the
intentional infliction of the suffering that is punishment. So the
first normative question that expressivists must confront is why
one should think this. There are some easy answers that are not
56 Id at 584 n 9.
" See Michael S. Moore, Educating Oneself in Public 384-87 (Oxford 2000).
58 J.L. Mackie, Ethics: In venting Right and Wrong 38-42 (Penguin 1977).
59 Hurd and Moore, 56 Stan L Rev at 1110 (cited in note 30).
60 Blackburn, 60 Md L Rev at 482 (cited in note 40).
61 Id at 479.
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available to expressivists. These are the answers that draw on a
utilitarian theory of punishment-a theory that takes the
expression of societal outrage to be an instrumental good in the
service of other, intrinsic goods.
As I outlined in Part I-C, a utilitarian might plausibly
suppose that the denunciation of crimes will allow a society to
vent its vengeful emotions in a way that prevents vigilante
justice. She might believe that such denunciation will reinforce
the values of law-abiding citizens in a way that keeps them law-
abiding. She might believe that denouncing crimes will frighten
others who are less law-abiding or educate those who are
ignorant. She might simply believe that such denouncement
satisfies the wants of most people, or provides them with a vital
means of social cohesion and shared identity.
The expressivist, however, cannot argue that expressions of
social condemnation will yield this familiar set of goods without
reducing expressivism to a mere means of achieving a utilitarian
program. He cannot argue that we should employ punishment to
express our highest and best ideals if the reasons that it is good
to do so depend upon other goods. For the expressivist promised
more. He promised us a theory of punishment independent of the
traditional theories of punishment, and thus independent of
claims that it will be an effective means of advancing the
utilitarian's agenda. If expressivists are to deliver on this
promise, then the expression of disapproval by criminal
punishment must be an intrinsic good, not merely an
instrumental good in the service of utilitarian goals.
For like reasons, expressivists cannot cobble their claims to
those of retributivists by arguing that the expressive function of
law comes into its own when the demands of desert are vague.
They thus must reject Fred Lawrence's claim that the expressive
effect of a given punishment must at least "inform our decisions
about the nature of that punishment," even if it does not, by
itself, justify the punishment.62 Nor can expressivists urge, as
Dan Kahan does, that "[tlhe proper retributive punishment is the
one that appropriately expresses condemnation and reaffirms the
values that the wrongdoer denies."63 If according offenders their
62 Frederick M. Lawrence, Punishing Hate 167 (Harvard 1999). See also Kahan, 63 U
Chi L Rev at 602 (cited in note 31) (noting that the expressivist view informs desert when
an individual "engages in behavior that conveys disrespect for important values.").
63 Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 591 (cited in note 31). For a more lengthy discussion of
the incompatibility of expressivism and retributivism, see Hurd and Moore, 56 Stan L
Rev at 1112-13 (cited in note 30).
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just deserts justifies punishing them at all, then it justifies both
the kind and quantity of punishment an offender should receive.
There is no conceptual room for a principle at odds with
retributivism to do work within a retributivist program. And
even if ambiguities inherent in a retributivst theory required
recourse to a foreign factor-say, expression of social outrage-
then that factor would be doing all the justifying work with
regard to the matters that are considered ambiguous. And then
the normative question with which we began would recur: What
makes expressing a society's disapproval of an offender's
criminal conduct intrinsically good? Ex hypothesi, it cannot be
that it is deserved. What accounts for its value?
Expressivists might be tempted to argue that if a good is
intrinsically good, then no argument is possible either for or
against it. An intrinsic good is, as it were, another primitive. Yet
the sheer fact that something is intrinsically good does not mean
that one cannot advance reasons to conclude that it has intrinsic
goodness. Certainly one cannot show it to be intrinsically good by
showing how it advances something else that is good. But this is
similarly true of categorical obligations, which cannot be justified
by reference to good consequences. Deontological permissions
and prohibitions can be justified by demonstrating how they
cohere with a mix of particular judgments and general principles
that one accepts as provisionally true.' It would simply be false
to claim that nothing can (or need) be said to justify a belief in
the intrinsic goodness of an act, or an institution, or a practice.
So the expressivist cannot escape the question of how he is to
defend, as inherently good, the expressive use of the power of
punishment.
In the end, it seems to me that there is no plausible answer
to this question. Some institutions and institutional practices are
arguably intrinsically good, such as educational institutions that
come as close as possible to affording equality of opportunity. But
employing the criminal law so as to express popular attitudes
does not seem of similar inherent worth. Those who consider the
expression of social attitudes to be intrinsically good, as opposed
to being good for something, might have a sense that there is a
kind of collective First Amendment right; a right justified by the
intrinsic goodness of "self"-expression. But when the self is not
64 For an insightful discussion of how one justifies first principles and how such
principles differ from intrinsic goods, see Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A General
Theory of the Criminal La w 159-87 (Clarendon 1997).
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an individual, the claim that its expression is an intrinsic good
becomes bizarre. It seems a kind of category mistake to liken the
nature and value of the collective expression behind a criminal
punishment scheme to the nature and value of an individual's
expression in a work of art or piece of poetry.
C. Making Moral Sense of Achieving Societal Expression
Through Undeserved Punishment
Let us suppose that we find some basis for concluding that
sending denunciatory messages to criminals via punishment is
intrinsically (as opposed to instrumentally) good. The next
question is this: Can sending a contradictory message be so good
that it justifies punishing an offender more than is deserved?
This question arises because we are to assume that expressivism
can justify punishment even when desert-oriented retributivist
and mixed theories cannot. By its own claim, it constitutes a
separate and autonomous account of when and why punishment
is justified. Hence, it must be the case that, at least in principle,
it can sometimes license punishment beyond what would be
deserved. Consequently, we must ask whether the expressivist
can plausibly claim that the good inherent in social
condemnation of crime has the capacity to justify punishing a
criminal more than she deserves.
If I were an expressivist about punishment, I would resist
the question. I would argue that the obligation not to punish an
offender beyond what he deserves is internal to the good of
expression. That is, the good of expressing condemnation is a
good at all only when the criminal being condemned fully
deserves the punishment that expresses the condemnation.
Because this is an intrinsic good, it is not possible to achieve
such a good absent desert. The obligation not to punish an
offender beyond what he deserves would be, on this argument,
not a side-constraint to attaining the good of expression; it would
be internal to that good. One could, I would argue, achieve the
educational benefits and other utilitarian gains caused by
expressions of condemnation even when the person who is
condemned is innocent, but we have already conceded that these
benefits are not what make the expression of condemnation
intrinsically good.
An expressivist who seized my argument as a friendly
amendment would certainly have to construe his theory of
punishment as deontological in character. He would have to
argue that we are categorically obligated not to express
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condemnation of those who do not deserve it, even when such
condemnation would maximize the expression of condemnation
of those who do deserve it. Such an argument would insulate the
expressivist's theory from the charge classically made against
the utilitarian: namely that his theory permits the punishment
of an innocent man.65
But mine is a false friendship. One cannot accept my offer to
rescue expressivism from the perils of utilitarianism without
completely trivializing the theory. For my amendment makes the
expressivist theory of punishment incapable of justifying any
punishment beyond what is deserved. So it seems that the
expressivist must bite the same bullet that has been rotting the
teeth of utilitarians over the years, for he must be prepared to
"communicate" with the public via the imposition of undeserved
punishment if he believes in his own theory and its autonomy
from other theories.
A final and related normative challenge is this one: Can
sending a message be so good that it justifies punishing an
offender less than is deserved? In many cases, it would seem that
we could surely express our condemnation of criminals without
actually punishing them.66 That is, we could obtain the good
sought by the expressivist theory-we could denounce what
deserves denouncing and contradict what demands
contradiction-without in any other way making those who are
contradicted and denounced suffer. If true, then the expressivist,
like the utilitarian, must admit that when condemnation can
better be achieved through means other than punishment, desert
drops out as a condition of punishment. That an offender richly
deserves to be punished is neither here nor there if he and his
act can be adequately condemned without such punishment.
Expressivists will surely handle the prospect of under-
punishment by repairing, in the words of one, to "what
convention and form contribute to meaning."67 Recognizing that
"[i]n some societies, and even in ours at an earlier time, public
denunciation by itself might have been sufficient to convey
condemnation of a wrongdoer," Kahan claims that in our society
today, only the imposition of suffering on an offender can express
65 See Part I-C.
66 See H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 66 (Stanford 1963) (arguing that "the
normal way in which moral condemnation is expressed is by words" and not by
punishment) (emphasis in original).
67 Kahan, 63 U Chi L Rev at 600 (cited in note 31).
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our condemnation of him and his action.68 "[T]he way for society
to show that it takes rape seriously, and to show that it
genuinely condemns a particular rapist, is to make him suffer."69
But such a refusal of the question will not do. For even if
Kahan has the sociology right (as he may well have), such a
response hardly meets the challenge that has been posed. The
question is not whether the expressivist can anticipate that in
present day circumstances his theory will permit the deserving
to go free. The question is whether he can stomach his theory
when happenstance makes it less happy. Can the expressivist
accept the implications of his theory in the case of a brutal rapist
who fully deserves punishment but who is lucky enough to live in
a society in which verbal condemnation is understood as sincere
and sufficient to convey due respect for the victim?
Even if expressivists succeed in characterizing as de
minimus the concern that contradiction and condemnation might
someday take a form quite different from punishment, they
would continue to be faced with the same prospect as that of
utilitarianism-that a society might (and ought to) merely
pretend to punish whenever such a pretense can be carried out
without detection. Why not create a brutal-rapist protection
program that gives rapists new identities in a faraway place,
while using the conventions of condemnation that exist in our
society to make a great show of (seemingly) punishing such long-
gone offenders? The expressivist can always insist that there is
an ineliminable risk that such false shows of punishment will be
discovered. But such a risk ought only to give the expressivist a
discount rate. On his own theory, if it is good to achieve public
condemnation of the social meaning of crime and bad to make
individuals suffer, then he should take some risks whenever he
has a good shot at achieving the good without the bad. And
nothing beyond concern for detection should give the expressivist
pause when pretense can do what he would otherwise ask of
punishment.
It would thus seem that expressivists fare no better than
corrective justice theorists, rehabilitation theorists, utilitarians,
and mixed theorists in their ability to escape the charge that
they have unjustifiably elevated their normative ideal over that
of achieving punishments that match just deserts. They must
thus join such other more traditional theorists in the
68 Id at 600-01.
69 Id.
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philosophical effort to persuade laypersons and academics alike
that there is no moral magic in the claim that persons should
receive only what they deserve-a task that I take to be both
unpromising and unworthy.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that there is good reason for criminal law
theorists to be unsatisfied with the menu of punishment theories
that has long specified the philosophical fare in criminal law. As
one canvasses the traditional entries, as I did in Part I, one is
struck by the seriousness of their conceptual and normative
problems. One well understands how there could be a market for
a fresh alternative-one that holds out the promise of providing
a normatively compelling reason to punish culpable offenders
without the conceptual problems that confound the corrective
justice theory, rehabilitation theory, utilitarian theory, mixed
theory, and retributive theory.
As I have argued, however, the newest temptation-
expressivism-is to be resisted.7 ° While some of the academy's
most creative contemporary thinkers have been captured by the
claim that punishment can be justified by its ability to contradict
and condemn the social meaning of crimes, I have outlined here
why one ought to have grave doubts that expressivism can lay
claim to normative superiority over desert-based theories of
punishment. I have further shown why it invites far more serious
conceptual challenges than do any of the traditional
philosophical perspectives, given its reliance on the amorphous
(and probably incoherent) notion of crimes having something
called "social meaning" that can be "contradicted" by
punishments. So I am going to return to toiling in traditional
fields, leaving those who have a fondness for bandwagons to
70 Even Joel Feinberg, whose early article The Expressive Function ofPunishment is
often cited by present-day expressivists, always held that expression of condemnation is
at most an incidental function of punishment and is not part of a properly conceived
theory of punishment, namely a theory that justifies the institution. Joel Feinberg, The
Expressive Function of Punishment, in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of
Responsibility 95, 95-98 (Princeton 1970) (arguing that punishment's expressive function
of conveying society's condemnation of an act is what distinguishes "punishments" from
mere "penalties"). See also Letter from Joel Feinberg, Professor, Arizona State
University, to Michael Moore, Professor, University of Illinois (Apr 1990) (on file with
author).
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what I take to be the hopeless task of fixing expressivism's
broken wheels.

